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ABSTRACT. This paper is concerned with Aotearoa/New Zealand’s changing relationship to Antarctica, and the
Ross Dependency in particular. Through a consideration of post-colonial theory in the Ross Dependency, it is argued
that a productive dialogue about the cultural politics of mainland Aotearoa/New Zealand can be opened up. After
some reflections on the post-1945 political and cultural trajectory of the country, attention is given to the place of the
Maori and their involvement in the polar continent and Southern Ocean. The adoption of Maori place-names on New
Zealand maps of the Ross Dependency is considered further because it helps to illuminate the country’s awkward and
incomplete post-colonial transformation. Arguably, such an adoption of Maori place-names in Antarctica contributes
to a vision of bicultural harmony. However, this is not a view shared by all observers. Developments affecting the crown
agency Antarctica New Zealand, alongside recent heritage projects, are scrutinised further in order to consider how
Maori–Pakeha relations influence and define contemporary understandings of New Zealand’s presence in Antarctica.
Finally, the paper briefly contemplates how a trans-Tasman dialogue with Australian scholars might enable further
analysis into how geographically proximate settler colonies engage with Antarctica and their associated territorial
claims to the continent and surrounding ocean.
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Introduction
‘In discussing the ‘New Zealand Empire’ in chapter 7,
I did not mention its biggest bit: the Ross Dependency
in Antarctica. The Ross Dependency is preserved from
exploitation by its harsh climate and the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959.’ (Belich 2001: 391)
James Belich’s aforementioned observation about the
Ross Dependency is typical of contemporary writing
on New Zealand’s national identity and allegedly post-
colonial condition. Within his best-selling account, Para-
dise reforged: a history of New Zealanders, the Antarctic
receives scant attention. New Zealand’s post-war trans-
formation from a ‘virtual colony’ (Belich’s words) of the
UK to a multi-cultural and multi-racial ‘South Pacific’
nation is explained with only the briefest reference to the
country’s largest colonial claim, the Ross Dependency.
This is surprising, given New Zealand’s status as a polar
claimant state and original signatory to the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty. If Antarctica does feature in more mainstream
historical and political analyses of New Zealand, it is
usually as an appendage or in relation to the 1979 Air
New Zealand Flight 901 crash into the side of Mount
Erebus (see Mahon 1984). More than 250 people, many
of them New Zealanders, perished.
There may, however, be a factor, which might help
explain the paucity of Antarctic discussion. Perhaps
Antarctica does not need to feature as an object of detailed
analysis because, according to Belich and others, New
Zealand’s territorial claim is simply ‘preserved’ by the
1959 Antarctic Treaty. In other words, Article IV of
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty has not only sealed the Ross
Dependency claim for the duration of the Treaty, but also
enabled it to be isolated from New Zealand’s post-1945
trajectory more generally. This intellectual manoeuvre
becomes all the more understandable if one considers
Belich’s claim (a widely held one within and beyond the
area of Antarctic studies) that the polar continent (as a
consequence of the Antarctic Treaty and associated legal
instruments) continues to enjoy the palliative presence
of science and an environmentally protective regime
(Belich 2001: 391–392; see Vidas 2000 for a specialist
interpretation).
Simply arguing that Antarctica has been neglected
gives the appearance of special pleading, which is un-
helpful. We have no desire to reinforce any sense of
Antarctica’s unique importance to New Zealand and cer-
tainly do not wish to consolidate any further the epigraph
‘a continent for peace and science.’ It also must be
acknowledged that the existing polar literature on New
Zealand has itself been parochial in its geographical
and intellectual horizons. Very few New Zealand-based
writers reflecting on the country’s relationship with the
Antarctic have been attentive to wider scholarly debates
about the country’s colonial/post-colonial politics (see, for
example, Quatermain 1961, 1967; Helm and Miller 1964;
Auburn 1972; Logan 1979; Prior 1997; and Templeton
2001, 2002). This corpus of scholarly work reflects un-
wittingly a broader trend — the marginality of Antarctica
to contemporary debates on what Derek Gregory has
recently labelled ‘the colonial present’ (Gregory 2004).
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To account for this lacuna, this paper seeks to
explore what difference it would make if New Zealand’s
involvement in the Antarctic region were fused with more
mainstream accounts of post-1945 political, economic,
and cultural transformation. If, as many scholars have
claimed, attitudes towards land and occupation have been
central to shaping expressions of New Zealand national
identity, then it is surprising that this discussion has
not embraced the polar landscape and the occupation
of the Ross Dependency (see, for example, Bell 1996;
Neuman and others 1999; Sinclair 1986; Barrowman
1996; and Byrnes 2001, 2002). Moreover, agencies such
as Antarctica New Zealand (ANZ) have recognised that
the Ross Dependency will play an increasingly significant
role within the changing post-Treaty of Waitangi politics
of New Zealand. The use of Maori place-names in
the Ross Dependency is perhaps one belated form of
recognition that all areas of New Zealand life need
to be exposed to bicultural scrutiny. Thus this paper,
written by two British-based authors with extensive
experience of working in New Zealand (but also informed
by estrangement), seeks to stimulate intellectual debate.
As a piece of work, it uses interviews and informal
conversations to foster further engagement in the absence
of other forms of primary material. As a consequence,
the paper should be considered as a modest starting
point for a discussion, which unsettles (in a construct-
ive sense) our understandings of Antarctica and New
Zealand.
Initially, consideration is given to some of the existing
themes and debates that have emerged in contemporary
discussions of New Zealand’s post-colonial history. Post-
colonialism is a contentious subject area and most of the
authors quoted here employ the term to convey a historical
sense of how New Zealand has undergone a social,
cultural, political, and economic transformation since
1945 rather than consider the ‘decolonization’ of theory
and practice (for an overview, see Young 2001, 2003).
Thereafter, the changing relationship between Pakeha
(New Zealanders of European descent) and Maori, and its
consequences for New Zealand’s connections to the Ross
Dependency, are addressed. As part of that examination,
the activities of the New Zealand Geographic Board
(NZGB) are investigated in order to reflect upon the
practices and underlying politics associated with place-
naming in the Antarctic (see Berg and Kearns 1996;
Kearns and Berg 2002). The penultimate section considers
the role that polar heritage might play in producing,
sustaining, and undermining visions of contemporary
bicultural New Zealand. Finally, there is an examination
of what can be gained by cross-fertilising two disparate
academic literatures: the post-colonial histories of New
Zealand and polar studies of the Ross Dependency. Across
the Tasman Sea, a new generation of Australian scholars
readily appreciate that the Australian Antarctic Territory
can no longer be treated as a distant appendage of a
metropolitan territory (see, for example, Collis 1999;
Hains 2002).
Fig. 1. Front cover of the New Zealand Journal of Geo-
graphy. The polar-centred perspective helped to remind
readers of New Zealand’s proximity to the Antarctic and
Southern Ocean.
Post-1945 New Zealand: Domestic identity
and territorial geopolitics
To understand the changing relationship between Maori
and Pakeha New Zealanders, it is useful in this context
to reflect on the inception and relevance of the Ross
Dependency. Although New Zealand first pressed a claim
to the Ross Dependency in 1923, most commentators
agree that a lack of political interest accompanied by
a dearth of financial resources prevented a more pro-
active polar policy (Auburn 1972; Logan 1979; Templeton
2001). Indeed it is widely accepted that without the
lobbying efforts of the New Zealand Antarctic Society
(NZAS) and local newspapers, political apathy would
have reigned supreme in the immediate post-1945 period.
A revived NZAS, under the leadership of individuals
such as R.A. Falla and Arthur Helm, was instrumental in
raising concerns about how New Zealand might occupy
and investigate its polar dominion (Logan 1979). These
worries were also widely echoed by New Zealand’s
regional newspapers and academic journals, which fre-
quently lamented the lack of political and popular interest
in the Ross Dependency (Fig. 1).
Within a decade of the ending of the Second World
War, New Zealanders were preparing in earnest with
their Commonwealth colleagues in Britain, Australia, and
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South Africa for a privately organised Trans-Antarctic
Expedition (TAE) and planning for the forthcoming 1957–
58 International Geophysical Year (Fuchs and Hillary
1958). The charismatic presence of Sir Edmund Hillary,
the conqueror of Everest, unquestionably aided this
transformation of interest (see Dodds 2002, 2005). The
New Zealand government contributed £75,000 towards
the TAE, in recognition that a mechanised crossing of
Antarctica would help to raise the profile of the Ross De-
pendency. By 1958, a decision had been taken to establish
Scott Base, a permanent scientific station on Ross Island.
Notwithstanding New Zealand’s political and sci-
entific encounters with Antarctica, the idea that the 1840
Treaty of Waitangi had provided a comprehensive ‘road
map’ for the ‘peaceful’ evolution of New Zealand was
being challenged (Orange 1987; Belich 2001). By the late
1950s and 1960s, the ongoing controversy surrounding
the contents of the English and Maori versions of the
1840 Treaty emerged more prominently in New Zealand
political life. As Claudia Orange (1987) has demonstrated,
according to proponents of the English language version,
the Treaty ceded to the British Crown the sovereignty
of New Zealand, and in return the original inhabitants
(the Maori) were given full rights of ownership over their
lands, forests, and fisheries. Only 39 chiefs, however, ever
signed the Treaty and disagreements soon emerged over
the interpretation of ‘sovereignty’ when settlers began
to appropriate lands in the North and South Islands.
Maori activists questioned the legitimacy of the Crown’s
behaviour and attempts were made via the Waitangi Day
Act (1960) to recognise outstanding injustices relating to
land ownership and resource allocation (Orange 1987).
Historically speaking, therefore, authors such as
Belich, Bell, and Orange have highlighted New Zealand’s
awkward and incomplete transition from British colony
to post-colonial state. There are two dimensions to this
awkward transformation. First, the relationship between
the Pakeha and Maori populations within New Zealand
became increasingly problematic as Maori activism
(alongside feminist struggles) increased in the 1960s.
It was contended that the Maori, far from being suc-
cessfully assimilated in the era following the Treaty of
Waitangi, were victims of racism, blatant discrimination,
and marginality. As Claudia Bell noted: ‘This Act
was subsequently mythologised as the founding of a
harmonious, bicultural New Zealand, despite obvious
contrary evidence. Internationally, this has given New
Zealand the image of good race relations, a peaceful
country’ (Bell 1996: 9).
In 1973, the Kirk government attempted to hold onto
this public understanding of New Zealand by converting
so-called Waitangi Day (6 February) into a public holiday
(New Zealand Day) when previously it had been a
‘national day of thanksgiving in commemoration of the
signing.’ Two years later, the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal
was created for the purpose of addressing outstanding
territorial and resource injustices and then proposing
recommendations for the resolution of conflict. According
to critics, the Tribunal was given no enforcement powers
and thus was perceived to be something of a ‘toothless
tiger’ (Orange 1987; Bell 1996).
Second, Britain remained unquestionably New
Zealand’s most significant trading partner in the immedi-
ate post-1945 era. Successive prime ministers from Sidney
Holland to Brian Muldoon often referred to Britain as
the ‘mother country’ on the basis of strong emotional,
cultural, economic, and military ties cemented in the
experiences of the two World Wars. The Crown continues
to appoint the Governor General, who has jurisdiction
over the Ross Dependency as well as mainland New
Zealand. While membership of the 1951 ANZUS pact
pointed to the growing importance of US–Australian
security relations, James Belich claims that many in
New Zealand ‘saw themselves as Britons too’ (Belich
2001: 392). There was, therefore, no simple cultural nor
geopolitical transition, as ties with Britain did not simply
evaporate from the 1950s onwards (Pawson 1992; Bell
1996). Britain and New Zealand continued to work closely
with one another as Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties
(ATCPs) and in the Commonwealth more generally.
Economic and cultural connections with Britain remained
at the forefront until at least the 1970s, when Britain’s
membership of the European Economic Community
(EEC) changed long-standing imperial trading patterns
(Johnston 1997; Belich 2001).
Even if many Pakeha New Zealanders were content
to remain ‘colonised subjects’ (the Queen is the Head
of State), Maori activists were seeking to remove the
remaining vestiges of colonial governance following the
Treaty of Waitangi. As the domestic politics of New
Zealand political life became increasingly divisive in
the late 1950s and 1960s, it is instructive to consider
how the Ross Dependency was being appropriated and
occupied. With the creation of Scott Base, following the
successful completion of the TAE and the IGY, New
Zealand established a permanent and colonising presence
in the Antarctic. The base was an essential element in the
country’s effective occupation of the Ross Dependency —
a settling presence. New Zealand, as one of the original
signatories to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, recognised that
the provisions of the Treaty were essential in consolidating
the claim to the Ross Dependency. However, Article IV
of the Treaty also acknowledged that non-claimant states
such as the United States reserved the right to press a claim
at a later date. Given the provisions of the Treaty, earlier
calls by some political figures to relinquish the claim to
the Ross Dependency did not have to be implemented
(see Beck 1986). New Zealand Prime Minister Walter
Nash is rightly credited with being an important advocate
of demilitarisation in Antarctica and the Treaty’s linkage
to the United Nations (Templeton 2001, 2002). The dec-
laration of the Antarctic as a nuclear-free zone (Article V)
also helped widen its appeal to the wider international
community, including India, which had raised the issue
of Antarctica in the United Nations in 1956 and 1958
(Sinclair 1976: 320; Chaturvedi 1990, 1996).
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The suspension of territorial claims (under Article IV)
unquestionably benefited small claimant states such as
New Zealand and distant claimant states such as the UK
because they were simply unable to match the scientific
and logistical activities of larger parties such as the
United States and determined gateway claimant states
such as Argentina and Australia (Dodds 1997). As part
of their wider Cold War strategy, successive New Zealand
governments generally sought a close relationship with
the United States, and this extended to polar co-operation.
New Zealand again benefited from this relationship
because the close proximity of the American McMurdo
Station to Scott Base meant that access to the latter was
aided and abetted by US icebreakers at the start of every
summer season. Many New Zealand scientists would also
testify that they had been the beneficiaries of American
waste management, as scientific equipment placed on
the McMurdo rubbish dump was routinely re-cycled by
grateful residents of Scott Base.
The implications for New Zealand’s changing geopol-
itical relationship with Antarctica were not to be felt until
the 1980s when the Labour government of David Lange
questioned not only the strategic wisdom of ANZUS (and
the right of the US Navy to enter New Zealand ports
without confirming whether nuclear weapons were on
board), but also challenged the legitimacy of the French
to carry out nuclear testing in the South Pacific. As part
of that review process, New Zealand was actively re-
imagined as a South Pacific nation, with distinct geo-
graphical interests, including the management of the Ross
Dependency (Dalby 1993; Johnson 1997; Lange 1990).
Renewed emphasis was thus given to New Zealand’s
local interests, as opposed to the global politics of the
Cold War. Between 1982 and 1988, New Zealand chaired
(in the form of lawyer Chris Beeby) the controversial
debates relating to the Convention for the Regulation
of Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), which in
1989 was rejected by Australia and France (Stokke
and Vidas 1996). For Lange, commitment to a South
Pacific nuclear free zone became the defining symbol
of the Labour administration (1984–89), although others
have given greater prominence to the repercussions of
radical neo-liberal reforms of the New Zealand economy
(Lange 1990; Dalby 1993; McKinnon 1993). Later
administrations, such as the Bolger government, claimed
that New Zealand was also defined by its geographical
and cultural relationship to Asia in another display of
geopolitical realignment (Johnston 1997).
Despite the growing interest in the international
politics of the South Pacific, New Zealand’s support of the
Ross Dependency remained financially and logistically
modest. Officials closely connected to the Antarctic feared
that it would simply disappear from the policy radar screen
following the demise of the Lange government (Prior
1997; S. Prior, personal communication, 11 December
2002). A 1989 White Paper and the 1994 Review of New
Zealand Strategic Objectives in Antarctica (MFAT 1989,
1994), however, reaffirmed the value of Antarctica to New
Zealand. Earlier fears of total disengagement were not
realised, as demonstrated by the 1996 decision by the
Bolger government to create a crown agency (Antarctica
New Zealand) for the purpose of promoting and co-
ordinating New Zealand’s Antarctic interests. Accompa-
nying this development was a renewed claim that New
Zealand had to re-imagine itself as a gateway state, with
specific responsibilities for environmental stewardship,
territorial sovereignty, and resource protection. Christch-
urch was identified as the major gateway hub on the basis
of its importance as a logistical centre for New Zealand
Antarctic operations that continue to involve Italy and
the United States as polar partners (Prior 1997; S. Prior,
personal communication, 11 December 2002).
Public education in combination with ANZ’s spon-
sored activities such as school visits, VIP visits, and the
Artists and Writers Programme (thereafter Artists pro-
gramme) are used to promote the Ross Dependency and
Antarctica more generally within domestic popular cul-
ture. According to the poet Bill Manhire, the Artists pro-
gramme has helped broaden the appeal of Antarctica and
purposefully consolidated the presence of the scientific
programme, because without scientists and others —
such as armed forces personnel — none of this
would be possible (B. Manhire, personal communication,
11 December 2002).
The pressures on New Zealand’s presence in the
Antarctic were unquestionably strained by the collapse of
the CRAMRA negotiations in the late 1980s. The prospect
of mineral exploitation in Antarctica had provoked major
policy concerns in New Zealand and elsewhere. The
subsequent adoption of the Protocol on Environmental
Protection (signed in 1991 and entered into force in
1998) banned all forms of mining and placed renewed
emphasis on environmental protection. With such a ban,
some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
feared a drop of interest among government ministers
and senior civil servants. The creation of ANZ in the
midst of the Protocol’s entry into force allayed those
fears. However, this important development occurred
alongside new fears that illegal fishing was placing
renewed pressures on Southern Ocean ecosystems. It
raised the spectre of how claimant states such as New
Zealand responded to environmental insecurities not only
on the continent but also in the surrounding Southern
Ocean. In the post-Protocol era, New Zealand has become
more assertive with regard to resource and territorial
rights following fears, for example, that illegal fishing was
occurring in the Ross Sea sector (see Bastmeijer 2002).
So, contrary to that opening quote from James Belich,
one could argue that the harsh climate is not a sufficient
preservative when it comes to the exploitation of fish in
the Ross Sea (Belich 2001: 391).
In 1999, the Royal New Zealand Navy used one of
its frigates, Te Kaha, to patrol these remote waters in
an attempt to deter such acts of illegal fishing. However,
the UK and Australia expressed concern regarding the
deployment of a warship in the Antarctic Treaty area.
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Until then, New Zealand had not been an active fishing
nation, despite being an original signatory to the Con-
vention for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR). Since 2001–02, however, six New Zealand-
registered fishing vessels have been licensed to fish in
CCAMLR 88.1 sub-area alongside mounting military
surveillance of other parties’ activities in the Ross Sea.
While seeking to monitor and prevent illegal fishing, New
Zealand has also sought, via a 2001 environmental report
on the Ross Sea, to promote its role as an environmental
steward in the Ross Dependency (Antarctica New Zealand
2001). As a gateway state, it is often argued within
New Zealand’s Antarctic community that it has a special
relationship with the Ross Sea region on the basis of
relative proximity (Prior 1997; Templeton 2002). As
Stuart Prior, the former head of the Antarctic Policy Unit
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)
concluded:
For New Zealand, geography, experience and reputa-
tion are valid and compelling parts of the equation.
Antarctica constitutes a national asset for a small
country with limited sinew and leverage in the world.
Our stewardship in the Ross Dependency needs to
be of the highest order that reflects our own national
values and aspirations. (Prior 1997: 15–16)
As with other Southern Hemisphere countries and so-
called gateway states, Antarctica is thus conceptualised as
a space in which nations cannot only display their national
prowess but also assert ownership. Antarctica is distinct
in the sense that New Zealand, as a founding Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Party, can operate as a key player on
the international scene. The elevated status that Antarctic
politics and conservation affords the country also helps
to relieve claims to a national identity from its persistent
branding as either Australia’s poor cousin or Britain’s
dependent. In one briefing paper prepared by MFAT,
an extraordinary act of geographical displacement was
announced: ‘The Antarctic is our closest neighbour and
dominates New Zealand’s geographical position’ (MFAT
2000). Such was the eagerness of officials to qualify
New Zealand’s intimate relationship with Antarctica
that Australia was mistakenly relegated to being the
second closest neighbour. The statement continued with
a perspicuous approach:
The Antarctic continent features largely in New
Zealand’s history with the early explorers being the
first users of the New Zealand Gateway to Antarctica
and thousands of New Zealanders since making
Antarctica part of their lives.
The Ross Dependency is constitutionally part of
New Zealand — anyone born there is a New Zealand
citizen and anyone who steals property or assaults
another person breaks New Zealand law and is subject
to our courts.
These kinds of rhetorical gestures (while occasionally
geographically suspect) provide evidence to contempor-
ary policy and visceral investments in Antarctica. Thus it
is unwise — as Belich (2001) and Bell (1996) do — to
Fig. 2. ‘Illuminations’ by Anne Noble. The map is part of a
series that critically investigates the place of maps within
New Zealand popular culture. Noble was an Art Fellow
with the Artists programme. Reproduced by courtesy of
the artist.
neglect the role of Antarctica in the building of Pakeha
settler identity, as it has arguably contributed to a very
strong sense of national identity and purpose.
The end result of such developments involving ANZ
has been to re-imagine and possibly even re-brand New
Zealand’s relationship with the Ross Dependency (Van
Ham 2002; Fig. 2). Since the creation of ANZ, there
has been a very deliberate strategy (with the assistance
of MFAT) to raise public understanding of the Antarctic
alongside promoting New Zealand’s importance to the
Ross Dependency. The Antarctic Visitor Centre in Christ-
church (located next door to Antarctica New Zealand)
and Kelly Tarlton’s Antarctic Encounter and Underwater
World in Auckland are two such examples where New
Zealand’s role in the Ross Dependency is explored
alongside more general developments affecting Antarctic
science, tourism, and environmental conservation. These
attempts to popularise New Zealand’s connections to the
Antarctic help in turn to justify the continued existence
of ANZ by championing values associated with envir-
onmental stewardship, resource protection, and scientific
endeavour. Territorial interests are also combined with
these aforementioned values and goals. As the Revised
New Zealand statement of strategic interest in Antarctica
stipulates:
New Zealand is committed to conservation of the
instrinsic and wilderness values of Antarctica and
the Southern Ocean, for the benefit of the world
community and for present and future generations of
New Zealanders . . . . This will be reflected in active
and responsible stewardship . . . . [and] commitment to
and credible presence in the Ross Dependency. (MFAT
2002)
These kinds of public pronouncements actually draw
upon longer-standing historical mythologies (and asso-
ciated narratives) relating to New Zealand’s post-Treaty
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of Waitangi development. Within post-colonial studies of
New Zealand, attention has been drawn to the importance
of land in shaping expressions of national identity (for
example, Byrnes 2001). In the absence of long-term
associations with the country, Pakeha New Zealanders
looked in the nineteenth century to their relationship
with landscape as evidence for their wise and responsible
stewardship. Nature was, in the words of one scholar,
transformed into a nation (Bell 1996: 36). It also helped
perpetuate an understanding of New Zealand as a benign
settler colony, which had successfully assimilated the
indigenous Maori population.
Perhaps such claims for environmental stewardship
in the Ross Dependency conjure up a New Zealand that
never really existed — one where integrated populations
co-exist peacefully in a settled landscape. Antarctica, as
an alternative location to Pakeha settlement in mainland
Aotearoa/New Zealand, however hostile the terrain,
appears to provide a stable landscape (or emotional
backdrop) to develop Pakeha national identity and a
form of ancestral connection with the Antarctic landscape
through geographical nomenclature. The whiteness of
Antarctica appears, therefore, to be less muddied and
troubled compared to metropolitan New Zealand and
associated race relations.
Bicultural New Zealand and Antarctica
A great deal has been written about New Zealand’s
connections to Antarctica, even if much of the literature
has concentrated on the evolving scientific, political, and
policy-orientated connections with the Ross Dependency.
There has been less commentary on the cultural import-
ance of Antarctica and the reasons why Pakeha New
Zealanders might consider with some pride these south-
erly connections. Even less has been written about Maori
interest and involvement in New Zealand’s exploration
of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean (see Haverkamp
2002), even though landscape relations have been a
central question in bicultural debates. Maori involvement
in Southern Ocean whaling is a better known dimen-
sion (O’Regan 2001; O’Regan, personal communication,
14 December 2002), but few polar commentators in New
Zealand or elsewhere would be aware, for example, that
Te Atu (who changed his name to John Sacs) travelled to
Antarctica in 1840 as part of the United States Exploring
Expedition that sailed off the coast of what subsequently
became the Australian Antarctic Territory. Or that Dr
Louis Potaka accompanied the famous American explorer
Richard Byrd to Marie Byrd Land in 1935. And how many
could claim to be aware of the presence of Te Tou who was
the youngest member of the 1957–58 IGY party stationed
at Scott Base and raised the flag at the official opening
of the base? At the time of Te Tou, the Trans-Antarctic
Expedition exploits of Sir Edmund Hillary, dominated the
accounts of New Zealand’s exploration, whereas official
reports of New Zealand’s IGY party concentrated on
charting and recording scientific achievements, as was
the norm in that era, rather than differentiating along lines
of ethnicity or gender (Quatermain 1961; Helm and Miller
1964).
One of the reasons why this state of affairs might
have existed is that many authors assumed that one
could talk of a ‘New Zealand’ contribution to Antarctic
exploration and science without specifying that it was,
for example, a ‘Maori’ contribution. If differentiation was
attempted, it tended to concentrate on either occupational
or scientific criteria, such as whether someone was a
scientist, explorer, mountaineer, or political figure. This
is not in itself surprising because of the widespread
involvement of Maori in a range of cultural, economic, and
sporting activities. Many observers would have felt that
such a differentiation was unnecessary and presumably
unwelcome.
As the Treaty of Waitangi negotiations continued to
gather momentum in the 1980s and 1990s, however,
Maori participation in Antarctic affairs began to be
addressed by officials in the Antarctic Policy Unit of
the MFAT and ANZ (S. Prior, personal communication,
11 December 2002). According to one former Antarctic
official, progress in terms of building partnerships has
been slight and perhaps the claim of the well-known
author of the Jake Heke trilogy, Alan Duff, characterises
the apparent indifference:
To 98% of the Maori Antarctica is a non-event and who
can blame them? They live in an emotional, kind of
more spiritual world and nor does personal challenge
figure greatly in their laid-back lives. As to myself, I’m
similar though I would take up the offer to visit . . . (A.
Duff, personal correspondence, 9 December 2002)
This view, however, would not be shared by all Maori,
and one of the challenges facing writers commenting on
this topic is not to essentialise a Maori view. Just as there
is considerable diversity within the Pakeha community;
so Maori interest in and commitment to Antarctica varies
among individuals and tribes. One such counter-example
is provided by Sir Tipene O’Regan, a member of the
South Island tribe Ngai Tahu and a long-standing (23 years
by 2002–03) member of the New Zealand Geographical
Board (NZGB). In an interview, Sir Tipene made the
case that the Ngai Tahu have a concept of the Antarctic
as a series of ‘floating white mountains’ (T. O’Regan,
personal communication, 14 December 2002). This may
reflect the fact that Maori in New Zealand may have seen
icebergs floating off the coastline of Southland province
and Stewart Island from the nineteenth century onwards.
In more recent times, Maori have been stationed at the
weather station on Campbell Island and, like many Pakeha
in the South Island, they share an affinity and interest in
the Southern Ocean including the ecosystem it supports
(T. O’Regan, personal communication, 14 December
2002).
As Pawson highlighted (1992, but see also Smith
2004), Pakeha and Maori have different practices and
poetics of belonging in the landscape. This indicates
that research into Maori connections to the Southern
Ocean and Antarctica might be fruitful in suggesting
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imaginings and relationships that are not necessarily
founded in the colonial practice of naming and claiming
landscape. The suggestion made here is to not repeat
the landscape tradition of conjuring noble savages into
benign scenes of landscape, nor to make any special
claims for indigenousness as a precursor to environmental
awareness, but to recognise that a cross-cultural dialogue
might offer a productive area of research in which to
reframe the cultural relationship between mainland and
outpost settlements. Postcolonial forms of thinking in
the Antarctic help in turn to question cultural forms and
norms of settlement found in mainland Aotearoa/New
Zealand. Given the explicit relation between landscape
representation (naming) and land use (claiming), it may
be pertinent, in the era of the Protocol, for Aotearoa/New
Zealand to make real the rationale of ‘stewardship’
through the development of practices within place that do
not continue to centre on possession and exploitation after
1840. To address the continuance of the colonial practices
of the Crown would not only allow Aotearoa/New Zealand
to go forward as a bicultural nation in Antarctica, but
would also open up a number of opportunities for further
reflection on the nature of environmental stewardship per
se. Throughout, some points of departure in thinking in
this direction are raised rather than deployed with the
intention of providing a definitive answer. Opening a
conversation across post-colonial Antarctic and Maori
cultures is timely given the evolving role that the Antarctic
plays in Pakeha settler identity, and the institutional
and academic isolation that has hitherto framed such
questions.
There are two evolving areas of Antarctic endeav-
our where Maori may well contribute further to New
Zealand’s evolving relationship with Antarctica and the
Southern Ocean — place-naming in the Ross Dependency
and resource management (which is considered in less
detail in this paper). With regards to the first issue, the
New Zealand Geographic Board (NZGB) looms large
in any consideration of Ross Dependency place-naming.
Recognised as a key factor in the contestation of power,
naming is integral to the relationship between place and
the politics of identity (Massey 1994; Massey and Jess
1995; Ashcroft and others 1995; Jacobs 1996). One of
the challenges that needs to be confronted is the rather
different approach to place-naming between Pakeha and
Maori. Recent scholarship in New Zealand has traced
these differences and sought to explore their cultural and
political implications (see, for example, Berg and Kearns
1996; Byrnes 2001, 2002; Kearns and Berg 2002; Smith
2004).
While the incorporation of Maori place-names into
the Antarctic landscape initially appears like an inclusive
cultural act, the prevailing creation of place through nam-
ing, can, as Berg and Kearns (1996) argued, nonetheless,
reinforce Pakeha dominance, by defining meaning in non-
indigenous terms:
Place-names are part of the social construction of
space and the symbolic construction of meanings
about place. Accordingly, we argue that the names
applied to places in Aotearoa assist in the construction
of the symbolic and material orders that legitimate the
dominance of a hegemonic Pakeha masculinity. (Berg
and Kearns 1996: 99)
Berg and Kearns argued that ‘naming becomes a form
of norming’ (Berg and Kearns 1996: 99), that helps to
reproduce rather than amend or replace the dominance of
Pakeha inscriptions on the landscape of mainland New
Zealand. More broadly, Yi-Fuan Tuan asserted that this
cultural superiority should not surprise, because, ‘it is
recognised that place naming is largely the preserve of
dominant social actors’ (Tuan 1974: 7). Thus, the Pakeha
authority to incorporate Maori names into the Antarctic
and Southern Ocean risks a parallel reproduction of
Pakeha dominance in naming practices in the mainland.
To address this power dynamic, therefore, naming must
not simply be seen as a symbolic act isolated from other
cultural practices involving Maori–Pakeha relations. In
order to function beyond a token gesture, place-naming
needs be embedded in a corresponding recognition and
promotion of other ways of seeing and being in place,
defined in indigenous terms.
The adoption of criteria by the NZGB for Maori names
in the Antarctic is arguably problematic. The Board’s
stated criteria stipulate that Maori words for species,
mammals, birds, geographic features, and place-names
will take preference over Maori ancestral names because
of a lack of ancestral connection with Antarctica. As Sir
Tipene has stated, Maori place-names ‘carry a cargo of
meaning and memory, they signpost the fact that place
has a human dimension’ (O’Regan 1990: xiii). More
importantly and distinctly: ‘Most Pakeha names mark
individual places and individual memories of parcels of
history. They generally have no particular connection to
each other, each standing in its own right. The meaning
of many Maori names though, can only be understood
through their connection to other names and other
places’ (O’Regan 1990: xiii). While Maori names may
signify an autochthonous connection to place, it would
seem (contrary to O’Regan) unreasonable to assume that
Pakeha names have no narrative connection with place
(Dodds 2005). The use of place-names such as Scott
Base and Hillary Coast contribute to an ancestral linkage
between Antarctica and New Zealand (and the former
imperial power, Britain). Likewise, it would be unwise to
assume that Maori do not have a non-exploitative view of
place compared to Pakeha.
Maori names, however, frequently belong to a tribal
group and often commemorate journeys of exploration by
ancestors (as arguably do Pakeha place-names in Antarc-
tica) or chart the relationship between tribes and land-
scapes (Smith 2004). As Sir Tipene contended, the Maori
voyagers: ‘Rolled up legends, whakapapa and our place-
names and carried them with us to be unrolled in a new
place and fitted to a new landscape’ (O’Regan 2001: 2).
For a culture that remains predominantly oral-based,
Maori place-names provide invaluable resources for
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story-telling. They have been described as ‘survey pegs
of memory,’ which help release parcels of history to a
tribal narrator and his/her audience (and often derive from
the sound of the landscape). When a tribe moved, so
did its place-names. They remained a mobile resource
and thus could be replanted on a landscape. Stories can,
therefore, be repeated in fresh spatial settings even though
former locations remain bound together within a web of
memory. Place-names, especially those commemorating
ancestors, cannot be simply transplanted onto places and
regions where the Maori have no physical connection.
So it would be quite unthinkable that the Maori name for
Mount Cook (Aoraki) could be simply transplanted to one
of Antarctica’s peaks. Aoraki is the most sacred of all the
ancestors for the Ngai Tahu tribe and provides a powerful
source of tribal identity. To use Aoraki in the context
of Antarctica would, therefore, reduce such a name to a
quasi-cultural artefact.
As a consequence of this significant connection
between place, tribal identity, and memory, the use of
Maori names, especially those that relate to ancestors,
would not be appropriate given there is no evidence that
the double-hulled canoes used by voyagers reached the
Antarctic continent. Where the NZGB has incorporated
Maori names onto the official maps of the Ross Depend-
ency, they have tended to be generic, such as mountain bird
names: Kea, Kaka, Ruru, and Kakapo (which is odd given
that these animals have no connections to Antarctica).
Others have reflected on Maori words for the elements:
Mumu (boisterous wind), Parawera (south wind), Pa Tio
Tio (frozen over), and Tarakaka (southwest wind). This
would appear to be less surprising because one could argue
that they have some relevance to the conditions found in
Antarctica. One of the most recent place-naming decisions
revolved around the crash of Air New Zealand flight 901,
which collided with Mount Erebus in November 1979.
The crash zone has been named Te Puna Roimata Peak
(Spring of Tears) and commemorates the loss of 257
people including many New Zealanders of all ethnic and
religious dominations.
Significantly, the NZGB does not engage in public
consultation with regards to the Ross Sea region, and thus
is quite different from mainland New Zealand naming
practices. In the case of the Antarctic, a technical com-
mittee considers proposals and makes recommendations
to the Board. All proposals for new names in the Ross
Dependency are then shared with the other major party
active in the region — the United States. Remarkably,
there is an agreement that New Zealand and the United
States share place-naming so that in any one given year
each country will have a 50% approval rate (T. O’Regan,
personal communication, 14 December 2002). The ap-
proved names are then sent to the Scientific Committee of
Antarctic Research (SCAR) Working Group on Geodesy
and Geographical Information for final approval and
incorporation. Most of the existing New Zealand place-
names commemorate either geographical features (such
as Dark Tower) and/or names involving Pakeha activities
and/or individuals (such as Hillary Coast and Quatermain
Glacier).
The NZGB is reportedly eager to encourage Maori
names for volcanic features and to incorporate Maori
and Polynesian mythical names. While this policy of
active encouragement may be seen as an attempt to
co-opt (however widely supported by Maori) a more
culturally diverse range of place-naming, it has not
been welcomed by all interested parties. The attendant
danger accompanying this policy is that it perpetuates
the mythology of bicultural harmony and yet fails to
acknowledge the colonial practices (naming, surveying,
and claiming land) of Pakeha both in New Zealand and the
Ross Dependency (Smith 2004). The Board’s American
counterparts are allegedly uneasy about the proliferation
of Maori place-names in the Ross Dependency. According
to Sir Tipene, the role of indigenous place-names raises
troubling issues not only relating to pronunciation by
native English speakers but also perhaps to the manner in
which native Americans and their land claims within the
United States have been addressed (T. O’Regan, personal
communication, 14 December 2002). With regard to the
former, geographers such as Kearns and Berg (2002)
have already demonstrated that unease over the usage
and pronunciation of Maori names is not unique to
American audiences. The Board specifies that Maori
landscape names must be euphonious to an international
audience. Within New Zealand, a significant number of
Pakeha have expressed misgivings about the suitability
of Maori place-names, particularly with regard to ‘Health
and Safety’ issues (T. O’Regan, personal communication,
14 December 2002). It has been suggested (privately to
Sir Tipene) that lives could be placed at risk because
of an inability of rescue crews to correctly pronounce
Maori-inspired place-names, for example. Presumably,
the widespread use of GPS helps ameliorate these kinds
of oral-based obstacles.
The fraught assimilation and often appropriation of
Maori place-names only addresses symbolic mappings of
the Antarctic and Southern Ocean, without a correspond-
ing consideration of the rights of possession that such
naming has historically claimed. Given the diversity and
strength of Maori relationships with the Southern Ocean it
is not unreasonable to expect that this geographical region
had importance in Maori economic as well as cultural
understandings. There are currently two outstanding
Maori claims before the Waitangi Tribunal on the sub-
Antarctic Auckland Islands. The Ngai Tahu, the principal
tribe of the South Island is able to recount voyages to
this region before European settlement. A party of Maori-
Moriori from the Chatham Islands colonised Port Ross in
the Auckland Islands in the mid-nineteenth century for a
brief period, departing in 1856 (King 2004). Moreover,
as the controversy regarding the management of Mount
Ruapehu on North Island has recently demonstrated,
Maori and Pakeha communities can fundamentally dis-
agree over how to address generational responsibilities
and environmental stewardship (New Zealand Herald
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22 December 2003). As Ailsa Smith has noted: ‘A Maori
sense of place, if it exists, would make explicit this link
with places that have grown familiar, not simply during the
lifetime of an individual but, more importantly, during the
extended lifespan of countless past generations’ (Smith
2004: 17).
Commercially speaking, and thus with reference to
the second major issue involving bicultural New Zealand
and Antarctica, Maori and especially the Ngai Tahu have
a profound interest in the Southern Ocean ecosystems.
Since the creation of the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary
(established by the International Whaling Commission
in 1994), Maori have been involved in whale-watching
activities, and in the future may have an interest in
the commercial development of the Ross Sea fishery.
The possibility for further involvement exists against a
backdrop of growing resource activism within the Ross
Dependency. Maori fishing rights are a significant source
of economic and cultural anxiety that have yet to fully
impact on Antarctic New Zealand’s Antarctic policy.
However, a successful claim to the Auckland Islands
would for example bring with it considerable exclusive
rights to fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
around the Islands. As such, this might imperil a vision
of Maori simply being incorporated into the dominant
strategies and visions of Pakeha with regard to Antarctica
and the Ross Dependency. The ongoing controversies
surrounding the ownership of the foreshore and seabed
surrounding mainland New Zealand suggest that these
kinds of territorial disputes are likely to be a feature of the
political landscape for some time to come (BBC 2004;
New Zealand Herald 4 November 2004).
In developing this argument, it needs to be acknow-
ledged that the narrative structure employed here does
not represent an attempt to bolt on some kind of Maori
dimension. Instead, with reference to a range of literatures
and intellectual terrains, it should be possible to challenge
underlying assumptions about the nature of Antarctica,
the role of New Zealand, and the belief that ideologies
and practices such as colonialism have no relevance to the
polar continent and surrounding Southern Ocean. It is also
axiomatic that the analysis developed here is intended to
facilitate further engagement, which should not be solely
confined to New Zealand and New Zealanders.
Going forward with a bicultural vision
of the Antarctic
New Zealand’s territories in Antarctica present a particu-
lar type of problem to a self-avowed bicultural nation.
Namely, how does a supposedly post-colonial nation
(that is nonetheless constitutionally bound to the Crown)
reconcile itself to a form of colonialism that acknowledges
the injustices of a colonial past while simultaneously
reproducing its practices in the present, with regard to the
Antarctic? Polar histories have tended to view Antarctica
as ‘empty space’ without indigenous peoples and thus
a place devoid of the contested politics of colonialism.
The fact of tabula rasa, rather than the fiction of it,
has meant that Antarctica remains an attractive space
for a colonial outpost in the form of the Antarctica New
Zealand programme and the colonial settlement of Scott
Base. And while Antarctica’s colonial geographies are not
overlain with the struggles of indigenous exchange, the
displacement (or lack of disruption) of colonial narratives
in Antarctic colonies implicates those spatialities in a
discussion of the postcolonial.
As postcolonial literature has investigated at length,
the project of colonialism was not simply about possession
of indigenous land, but involved a whole set of dominant
practices and performances in defining space in relation
to a metropolitan centre (Carter 1987, 1992; Driver 2001;
Jacobs 1996; Pratt 1992; Samuel 1994; Thomas 1994;
Thomas and Loshe 1999; Ryan 1996; Gregory 2004).
Antarctica’s lack of indigenous population does not,
therefore, mean that colonialism and associated practices
such as surveying and permanent occupation cannot be
cross-examined with a reference to the former British
colony, New Zealand. In other words, the authors reject
Belich’s claim that the 1959 Antarctic Treaty simply
preserves the territorial status quo. It also performs
another vital function, namely assisting signatories such
as New Zealand to evade their colonising relationship
with Antarctica in favour of a more benign commitment
to scientific activity and environmental protection.
If science provides one mechanism for avoiding con-
sideration of how colonial relationships were established
within Antarctica, then the creation and reproduction
of polar heritage offers another cultural safety valve.
As other scholars have noted, heritage (with associated
exhibitions and museums) has contributed greatly to the
formation of national identities and histories (Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983; Cannadine 2001; Huggan 2001).
Heritage helps tell stories and constructs nationalist
visions and narratives of a country and its population.
The increased investment in the Artists programme by
ANZ, and subsequent production of a national ‘landscape
aesthetic’ for Antarctica is one such way. Public exhibits
of artwork play their part in preserving a record not only of
the past but also in contributing to a contemporary political
agenda regarding New Zealand’s scientific, political, and
environmental profile in Antarctica.
With reference to the Ross Dependency, contestation
is not simply about challenging the imaginative spatial
inscriptions of place, but, more importantly, about how
New Zealanders imagine themselves in Antarctica (the
site of the nation’s southernmost outpost rather than
southernmost frontier). At this point, the confidence of
a bicultural society with integrated cultural forms breaks
down, to exhibit a seemingly exclusively Pakeha culture
and heritage. While not wanting to over-estimate the
coherence of the histories and preoccupations of the
heritage business, two important questions deserve further
consideration: who represents heritage? And what do
these representations of heritage do? In answering these
questions one might look to the national and heritage
bodies in order to question how they represent (if at
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Fig. 3. Sir Edmund Hillary’s tractor from the Commonwealth Trans-
Antarctic Expedition (1955–58). It is exhibited in the Canterbury Museum
in Christchurch.
all) historic and contemporary Maori connections to the
Antarctic and Southern Ocean.
Arguably, there is a consistent reproduction of the
biography of the white male subject as a shaping entity in
the Antarctic landscape (reproduced in Ross Dependency
place-names such as Quartermain Glacier, Hillary Coast).
This subject, in turn, is made to stand for the history
of the Antarctic, a historical ordering that disregards
any other relationship to place, and potentially narrows
the field for the development of future relations to the
Ross Dependency. There is a need to read this legacy as
constitutive of the construction of the cultural landscape of
Antarctica within the New Zealand geographic imaginary
(both Pakeha and Maori). Predominantly it is a social
and symbolic production that occurs both in the naming
of places and the heritages that are paid attention to in
museums, such as Edmund Hillary’s tractor, which is on
display in the Canterbury Museum (Fig. 3). The strength
of this production of Pakeha masculinities in the history
of the settlement of the Ross Dependency is evidenced in
the lack of any photographs of Te Tou raising the flag at
Scott Base in either the archive or the contemporaneous
newspapers of the Canterbury Museum Document Centre
(B. Norris, personal communication, 8 December 2003).
Emphasising the histories of the Crown and their
continuance in the present, by default creates a view
of Antarctica as a singular, bounded space of colonial
history. The continuance of reading Antarctic histories
through the activities of dominant actors can be witnessed
at the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa recent
exhibition ‘Antarctic heroes’ (May–October 2004). As a
national museum that has received much attention from
postcolonial scholars, New Zealand policy-makers, and
Maori activists, the exhibition is a potent reminder of
the lack of bicultural consideration that is perceived to
be required in approaching polar histories. Given that
the museum declares itself as the site of ‘stories of
the New Zealand land and its peoples’ this remiss of
cultural consideration is marked (not least because the
display originally derives from the ‘South: race to the
Pole’ exhibition staged at the National Maritime Museum
in London). Through the focus of the exhibition, the
concentration on the colonial past of racing to the Pole
makes a seamless transition into the colonial present. This
in turn affects a ‘whitening’ of the Antarctic space in
the New Zealand imaginary, as a history of conquering
landscape is exchanged for a history of its conquerors or,
in the case of Scott, those that were conquered by it. But
any potential decolonising of the geographic imagination
is always likely to be fraught. For example, as Baden
Norris of Canterbury Museum has pointed out, the reason
Te Tou raised the flag at the opening of Scott Base in the
1950s was because he was the youngest member of the
expedition, not because he was Maori.
One might ask, at this stage, what are the implications
of these ‘white imaginings’ in terms of bicultural New
Zealand identity? Antarctica, framed as an exclusively
white space, is an extreme realisation of Pakeha desire for
a belonging, exhibiting an uncontested pride in settling
one of the most extreme environments in the world.
Given Pakeha history, the empathy with settler societies is
apparent and understandable (Lamb 1999; Neumann and
others 1999). However this empathy has its complications;
by locating Antarctica as a parallel of settlement without
the disturbances of indigenous peoples, the implications
of that colonial history are disavowed. The production of
a continuous history elides the changes in Pakeha–Maori
relations that Paul Spoonley argues from the 1980s mark
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a change in Pakeha identity: ‘They moved from seeing
themselves as “colonised” (in relation to the British) to
a perception of themselves as “colonisers” in relation
to the Maori’ (Spoonley 1995: 24; more generally, see
Blunt and Rose 1994). Located within the safety of a
comfortable spatial margin, narratives of belonging that
emphasis an a priori whiteness, reinforce pride in the
colonial continuation of the Crown.
If Pakeha pride is located in settlement of New
Zealand’s territory of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean,
it nonetheless continues to unsettle relations at home by
displacing colonial fantasies from mainland to outpost,
and thus calls into question the vision of a success-
ful bicultural nation. While postcolonial literature has
stressed the operational power of representation in the
establishment of hegemonic meanings of place, it is also
pertinent to think about how Antarctic cultural industries
could offer a space within which to contest exclusive white
histories. Christchurch, as a self-appointed gateway city
and celebrated as the most English of cities, is a key
site in the production of meanings about the Antarctic
to ever-increasing visitor and indigenous audiences,
which are predominantly tourist, professional, scientific,
and academic. In the Antarctic Gallery in Canterbury
Museum, for example, amongst the display of almost
exclusively ‘Heroic Era’ — 1890s–1910s — material,
there is one photocopied reference to Maori connections
to the Antarctic. In Maori folklore the aurora was called
‘Tahu Nui A Rangi’ (the great burning in the sky), and
thought to be smoke and light from the fires reflecting
off the ice lit by kinsmen lost in the cold seas of the
south. Surprisingly, the museum currently has no policy
to consider the production and negotiation of bicultural
heritages.
Similar to Canterbury Museum, and like many of the
smaller Antarctic cultural institutions in New Zealand,
the New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust (NZAHT) is
exclusively concerned with the restoration and dissemin-
ation of artefacts from the Heroic Era of exploration, and
thus emphasises the continuing histories of the Crown.
The Trust has emerged out of the larger and better-funded
United Kingdom Antarctic Heritage Trust (UKAHT) and
continues to share in its commemoration of artefacts of
‘national importance.’ For example, the NZAHT and
UKAHT both appealed for funds from the public to
purchase objects at the 2001 Christie’s polar sale under the
slogan ‘Your country needs you.’ Disagreements between
the two trusts have tended to be focused around differing
ideas over what are the most appropriate conservational
practices rather than any question over why the heritage of
Scott and Shackleton should continue to be of importance
to Aotearoa/New Zealand. In other words, journalists,
political organisations, and heritage bodies alike assumed
that these connections were worthwhile rather than
considering the matter explicitly.
Considerable cultural and financial investment has
gone into the preservation of the history of the Crown,
such as the large-scale press coverage of the conserva-
tion activities of the NZAHT, return visits by veteran
‘Antarcticans’ such as the New Zealand members of the
TAE, the visit of Princess Anne to the historic huts, the
holding of the keys to Scott’s Discovery Hut at Scott
Base, the logistic support of Antarctica New Zealand,
and contributions from New Zealanders in the form of
donations. Perhaps even more surprising, and in stark
contrast to the aforementioned investments in the artefacts
of the ‘Heroic Era,’ much debate has ensued over whether
New Zealand’s objects of polar history, in the form of
the TAE Hut, can be considered heritage at all. The
popularity and financial investment in these objects of the
Heroic Era form dramatic representations of the emotional
investment that the journeys of imperial Britain’s explorer
heroes such as Captain Scott stimulate in contemporary
Pakeha audiences. Antarctica, as a consequence of these
kinds of performances, is culturally frozen as a proverbial
heritage site.
The pragmatic reasoning for the maintenance of such
singular histories (and associated heritage) can perhaps be
found in the Heritage Trust’s close financial association
with the tourist industry and its maintenance of a view of
the Antarctic as a space of heroic endeavour, or adventure
tourism. However, within this model of heritage, place
becomes one-dimensional and the rights of an uncontested
inheritance claimed by default. As remembering occurs in
the present it is pertinent to think about how contemporary
practices in dealing with histories affect the building of
either inclusive or exclusive national identities.
The Antarctic Gallery in Canterbury Museum is
scheduled to be redesigned in the next few years, and thus
would present an opportune moment for the consideration
of the role of its history in considering other visions of the
Antarctic and the Southern Ocean. Amongst the archives
at Canterbury Museum, it is perhaps not surprising to
find that Captain Scott and the Discovery crew attended a
dinner at the Savage Club in Christchurch before departing
for Antarctica. The main entertainment for the evening
was a performance by ‘The Sagacious Savage’ about the
maintenance of the proper boundaries of civilisation by
the exclusion of Maori from the club (Canterbury Museum
Document MS212:36, No 156). The play concluded
with the white settlers being boiled alive by Maori in
a big cooking pot after their inadvisable admittance of
Maori to the Savage Club (for a general account of
racial performances, see Pearson 2004). This particular
cultural act is highlighted only to clarify the importance of
cultural power in producing, circulating, and legitimating
racial hierarchies and boundaries between civilisation
and barbarism. Such a distinction was perhaps one of
the most important observations concerning colonial
practices made by post-colonial scholars such as the late
Edward Said (1978, 1993).
There are many other stories of cultural interaction
that remain dormant in the archives. For example, Edward
Wilson noted and drew images in his diary of visits made
to the Maori Pa at Kaiapo, Maori graves, and dance
performances before Discovery set sail from Lyttelton
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Fig. 4. Maori visitors on board, Lyttleton (c.1901–04). Reproduced by courtesy of the Royal Geographical Society.
(Fig. 4). The return visits from Maori to Discovery
were recorded in photographs in the Royal Geographical
Society photographic archives. Wilson recorded:
The old chief then addressed us in Maori and an
interpreter told us all about it . . . then they sang to us in
Maori, then tea and cakes, then a visit to a very English
church, and then after many photos were taken, we
went off to an old Maori battlefield where we had an
excellent picnic lunch, and a wander round the battle
ground, where a monument has been erected. (Wilson
1901: 39)
Within the cultural encounter (Pratt 1992) between
Antarctic explorer and indigenous settler, a blind spot
in Antarctic cultural history dramatically pronounced
itself. As picnic lunches on Maori battlefields and
anthropological reflections by the crew suggested a settled
history of colonialism, the performances of the savage
club pointed to the alleviation of its unsettling affects
through theatre.
For a seemingly more positive contemporary view of
an integrated bicultural Ross Dependency, one might point
to the 2003/04 New Year celebrations at Scott Base, where
the New Zealand cargo crew entertained the Americans at
McMurdo Station with a performance of the Maori haka.
However, the appropriation of the indigenous through
sporting practice (Jackson and Hokowitlu 2002; Maclean
2003), in keeping with the naming of All Black Peak in
the Ross Dependency, can be viewed as another symbolic
act of Pakeha dominance that sidelines a more substantial
or challenging Maori involvement. The haka is for many
Maori not only a vigorous dance but also an act of cultural
assertion (Calder 1998).
Some Maori activists object to the use of the haka by
the All Black rugby team precisely because of the assumed
representation of Maori as ‘the tamed savage’ successfully
settled into a Pakeha-dominated society. Keith Sinclair
once claimed that sport, alongside other activities such as
war and farming, helped to cement claims to a distinct
bicultural New Zealand identity. As he noted, ‘Rugby
stimulated national pride and national feeling. It brought
the nation together, providing a focus of feeling of unity. It
brought Maori and Pakeha together’ (Sinclair 1976: 152).
The value of sport as a binding agent (and the continued
performance of the haka in rugby games) has been
challenged in recent years. Arguably such expressions
of Pakeha pride at the myth of Aotearoa/New Zealand as
a harmonious space of race relations (‘We are all New
Zealanders’) neglect the difficult but productive exercise
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of confronting the legacy of the Crown and its idealised
narratives, which continue to find their expression in the
Ross Dependency.
Conclusions
As New Zealand engages with a highly visible process
of nation-building, which attempts to embrace indigenous
and non-indigenous peoples, it is often easier to locate this
change within the formation of cultural symbols (such as
place-naming and the adopting of indigenous practices
like the haka) rather than to employ substantial changes
in institutional practices (such as actively supporting
Maori involvement in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean
or critically examining the production and consumption
of heritage industries). Arguably, targeting the latter
would involve a far more wide-ranging examination
of particular constellations of power, knowledge, and
geography (Gregory 2004) in the production of cultural
representations of the Ross Dependency.
Ironically, to indigenise settler nationalism in non-
indigenous ways (such as inappropriate forms of place-
naming or appropriation of cultural motifs) only succeeds
in confirming Pakeha dominance and the male mytho-
logizing that is so embedded in New Zealand Antarctic
cultures. Unsurprisingly, some Maori have deep concerns
over the cultural misappropriation and branding of
Aotearoa/New Zealand through Maori imagery (A. Duff,
personal correspondence, 9 December 2002). Perhaps,
the real opportunity for a double-vision of the Antarctica
and the Southern Ocean lies adjacent to the necessity to
readdress symbolic practices in Aotearoa/New Zealand
and the Ross Dependency, and would entail challenging
the exculpatory stories of Antarctica, especially with
regard to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the role of science
in shaping Pakeha activities.
Decolonising New Zealand’s relationship to
Antarctica should not been seen in isolation. Across the
Tasman Sea lies Australia, which in turn makes claim to
more than 40% of Antarctica. Both settler colonies have
laid claim to extraordinarily large territories in a manner
that bears many similarities with their colonial forbearers.
Territories have been mapped, resources evaluated, bases
established, and flags thrust into the ice. One challenge
for trans-Tasman post-colonial dialogue is to explore
further how Antarctic territories have not only been and
continue to be appropriated, but also the manner in which
they inform (often discretely) contemporary cultural and
political policy within the metropolitan territory (see
Collis 1999; Hains 2002). Critically, however, it has to
be acknowledged that the modern states of Australia
and New Zealand are created in fundamentally different
manners — Australia through the claim of terra nullis and
New Zealand via treaty. While Antarctica continues to be
significant in emboldening claims to a more benevolent
national identity and national character in New Zealand,
Australia has never proposed that Aboriginal place-names
should be incorporated into the maps of the Australian
Antarctic Territory.
The challenge for all those interested in the rela-
tionship between settler colonies such as Aotearoa/New
Zealand and Australia (and elsewhere including Argentina
and South Africa) and the Antarctic is to open up
a different kind of cultural dialogue and geographical
engagement. A post-colonial approach to Antarctica
would be invaluable because, as Derek Gregory has wisely
noted:
Post-colonialism revisits the colonial past in order to
recover the dead weight of colonialism: to revive its
shapes, like the chalk outlines of a crime scene, and to
recall the living bodies they so imperfectly summon
to presence. But it is also an act of opposition. Post-
colonialism reveals the continuing impositions and
exactions of colonialism in order to subvert them:
to examine them, disavow them and dispel them.
(Gregory 2004: 9)
This paper has attempted to develop a sense of what
might be called the post-colonial present in Antarctic
and New Zealand studies. The challenge remains for
Antarctic scholars, policy-makers, and those involved in
the heritage industry to take up the dead weight of those
colonial questions in order to interrogate and subvert their
allegedly post-colonial present.
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